groups make of evaluations. The first challenge therefore is to increase the relevance of evaluation for people who are regulated, for people who are managed, and for people doing their jobs. Do we make our evaluation reports freely available, or do we limit publication to corporate stakeholders from business and government? Are we proactively sharing data sets and distributing reports, or are we only circulating 'executive summaries' when requested?
These questions of empowerment should be high on the agenda. In his keynote to this conference Patton (2000) suggested that evaluators and auditors in their day-to-day work should ask themselves to what extent their particular activity will help strengthen democracy. Fitz-Gibbon (2000) , in her keynote, reported on the way in which her institute presents feedback to schools by making data sets about schools available to them. In the Netherlands, the Education Review Office produces annual 'quality cards' with data on primary and secondary schools that is made available through the internet to parents, children, teachers and other grassroots groups.
The Second Challenge: Evaluating the Collaborative State and Partnering Arrangements
The second challenge concerns the ways in which evaluators deal with the network society, the collaborative state or 'partnering arrangements' between organizations. Public-private partnerships, consortium-based governments, 'negotiating' governments and 'joined-up' governments are fashionable concepts in Europe currently. Whether these arrangements are new or are largely neocorporatist developments from history now framed in new words, remains to be seen. What is true about these developments, is their pervasiveness recently: what are the implications of these developments for evaluators?
There have been a number of responses to these questions (Gray et al., in press; Mayne et al., 2001) . Some argue that no new challenge is presented by this: evaluators only have to use their usual toolkits to evaluate collaborative arrangements. Others suggest that the changing nature of relationships between corporate actors in the collaborative society is so pervasive and complex that evaluators and auditors need completely new methodologies and paradigms. A third view is that evaluators need not worry, because in the collaborative state, evaluation is not necessary as we are surrounded by trust, commitment and reputation. Indeed evaluating trust(-based) relationships leads to unintended side effects and can even kill trust. Evaluation then acts as a trust-killer.
These positions help to define the problem but they are too narrow in their approach to provide a helpful means to meet the challenge. Below three other perspectives are outlined.
First, evaluation could focus on answering the question whether the intrinsic mechanisms within partnering arrangements, network management and other joined-up activities are working as intended and do not produce perverse incentives or dysfunctional behaviour. It is also desirable to investigate the social and economic costs and benefits of high-trust arrangements since there is no a priori evidence that trust always works in a socially beneficial way. Sociologists have
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shown that mafia-type groups have many high-trust relationships and social capital, but nobody would disagree that these 'social arrangements' have negative consequences (Flap et al., 1998) . Trust can also lead to social exclusion of people who are cut out from high-trust relationships.
Second, evaluation is needed in the collaborative state to bring order to the potential complexity (some might say chaos) of all the partnering arrangements. Public-private partnerships, for example, appear simple when formulating the arrangement deal, but these may conceal intricate networks of relationships within the parties on each side of the deal. Evaluation may be used to find out for parliament and society at large the extent to which people and organizations within the arrangements deliver to the agreed standards of outcomes and means.
Third, evaluation can also assess the collaborative relationship itself. Transaction costs of highly decentralized collaboration can be high, so empirical knowledge on transaction costs and partnering arrangements is necessary. Though partnering arrangements are within and between organizations, the human and social factor is crucial to the success of networks and collaborative arrangements. It is people who exchange ideas, invest in each other and in each other's networks, 'create' glass ceilings that reduce upward mobility for certain social groups, form (and destroy) friendships within and between organizations, and ask for and give advice. Using approaches and instruments that the sociology of networks has produced over the years can help evaluators (Mayne et al., in press ). Box 1 describes key explanatory factors for the success of these arrangements. 2
The Third Challenge: Foregrounding Explanatory and Programme Theories
The definition of an explanatory theory used here is a set of propositions able to explain behaviour of people and organizations and their (intended and unintended) outcomes. Examples are sociological theories on determinants of social capital (Coleman, 1990) , the theory of collective action explaining why people voluntarily participate in producing private goods but not public goods (Olson, 1971) , cognitive theories on dissonance reduction and economic theories about path dependency and transaction costs in economics (Picciotto, 2000) .
Not long ago 'real' (not realist) evaluators did not worry or think about these kinds of theories, and most 'real' theoreticians never thought about evaluation. Lee (2000: 127) even notes that 'the well-known writers in the field of evaluation theory did not receive their formal education in a programme designed to produce professional evaluators'. Shadish et al. (1995) , in Foundations of Program Evaluation, describe theories related to persons (like Scriven, Rossi and Cronbach) and moreover note that there is not much good theory in evaluation.
Debates on theory in evaluation, nicely summarized by Lee under the heading 'The Cold War in Evaluation', have largely been focused on fights between positivism, post-positivism, constructivism and other-isms. Central to the idea of an explanatory theory is that it is not related to one incident or a person, but exists independently. With realist evaluation a productive line of theoretical thinking has entered in the field of (practical) evaluation work in Europe (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) .
It is also productive to consider the implicit theories underlying policy instruments like subsidies, levies, information campaigns, adoption strategies, vouchers and regulation, as well as policy programmes (Chen, 1990) . Central to this is the notion of an impact model (Rossi et al., 1999) . For over 50 years, policy researchers and evaluators have paid attention to the (social and behavioural) premises or mechanisms that lie behind instruments and programmes in order to understand (and predict) why programmes and instruments are successful. 3 The US General Accounting Office calls this the 'reconstruction of underlying models of (proposed) programs' and distinguishes between conceptual and operational reconstruction. A conceptual reconstruction concerns the social and behavioural logic behind the programme, while an operational reconstruction focuses on why it is assumed which actors will do what in order to make the programme a success.
In earlier work I referred to the concept of the policy theory, as a:
system of social and behavioral assumptions that underlie a public policy which have been reformulated in the form of premises (or propositions). These premises reflect beliefs of policy makers about the cognition, attitudes and behaviors of the policy's target groups . . . But they also refer to more structural factors on which policy makers have been making assumptions. (Leeuw, 1991) Vedung (1997: 138) speaks about 'intervention theories', which contain 'all the (assumed) empirical and normative presuppositions and assumptions embodied in the policy program by its initial framers'. 4 Methodologies to reconstruct 'underlying theories' are available in textbooks and also in the form of intelligent software like Belvedere and Sensemaker (Leeuw, 2000b) . There are a number of core ideas underlying these approaches. First reconstructing and assessing the underlying logic of a programme (activity) are necessary to identify future opportunities for the programme. The more sound the premises/ assumptions are on which a programme or an instrument are based, the greater the chance that the programme will succeed.
Second, these underlying logics have to be reconstructed, because they are usually not made explicit by policy makers, politicians or bureaucrats. Third, there is no a priori evidence that these underlying assumptions -or 'pet theories' -are valid, i.e. are logically consistent and empirically correct.
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However, given that there is a general consensus that evaluation practice and explanatory and programme theory are related, the new challenge is how to improve the quality of theories that underlie policies. What can be learned from the social and behavioural sciences about determinants of behaviour of individuals and groups? How to translate frontier research and knowledge from sociology, psychology and economics into our own evaluation practices in ways more productive than simply 'listing' variables? This is addressed in an interesting article by Tilley (1999) entitled 'Evaluation and Evidence-(Mis)Led Policy', in which he describes how evaluation studies can mislead policy making and implementation. One of Tilley's examples is when evaluators mis-reconstruct policy theories, leading to wrong advice being offered to policy makers and society.
The Fourth Challenge: Unintended and Undesirable Side Effects of Evaluation
With the expansion of evaluation, we should intensify our reflections on the unintended and undesirable side-effects of our activities. One of the earliest signs that this topic was receiving attention can be found in a study by Donald Campbell carried out in the early 1970s (Shadish et al., 1995) . Robert Schwarz is working on a book that explores the following dilemma.
There is a desire to supply managers, policymakers, legislators and the general public with evaluative information that is perceived to be reliable, valid and credible. Evaluative information that lacks these characteristics stands little chance of enhancing transparency, accountability and democratic governance. Yet, mechanisms for assessing the 'quality' (i.e. reliability, validity, credibility) of evaluative information conjure up perverse images of what has been termed an audit society characterized by increasing layers of inspection, audit, evaluation and assessment. The audit society expends a huge amount of resources in assurance activities whose most immediate consequence is to increase bureaucratization. Smith (1995) also discusses several other unintended consequences. So monitoring and investigating ('auditing') performance can inhibit innovation and lead to ossification: organizational paralysis brought about by the system of performance measurement. He also pays attention to tunnel vision (Smith, 1995) . 'Tunnel vision can be defined as an emphasis on phenomena that are quantified in the performance measurement scheme at the expense of unquantified aspects of performance.' Other unintended side effects according to this author are 'suboptimisation' which is defined as 'narrow local objectives by managers, at the expense of the objectives of the organization as a whole' and 'measure fixation', 'an emphasis on (single) measures of success rather than (on) the underlying objective '. Fitz-Gibbon (1997: 87-95 ) followed Smith's approach in a survey of 104 headteachers of primary schools in the UK. One of the questions of this study was to find out to what extent monitoring, inspection and audits contribute to school effectiveness. She found that:
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with the exception of ossification, each of these possibilities (i.e. unintended side effects . . .) was commented upon by headteachers in open-ended items in the questionnaires. These are not theoretical problems but actual, already-perceived problems. (FitzGibbon, 1997: 87) Light (1993) investigated the advantages and disadvantages of the growing importance attached to Inspector-Generals (IGs) within the US Federal Government and found that 'as the IG numbers go up, effectiveness may go down' (Light, 1993: 223) . This is consistent with the so-called 'performance paradox' (Meyer and O'Shaugnessy, 1993) , where the simultaneous proliferation and noncorrelation of performance measures, which are central to the idea of auditing, occur. An organization which aims at safeguarding its performance through the application of performance measurement instruments is not necessarily an effective organization.
Reviewing studies in this field over the last 5-10 years (Leeuw, 2000a) , I conclude that it is reasonable to assume that evaluation, however well intended, will have unintended and undesired side effects that jeopardize the effectiveness and efficiency of the public, the private and hybrid sectors. Some compare these 'perverse effects' with 'collateral damage'. We can not, nor should we, deny these side effects. For me the challenge is to develop approaches to detect unintended side effects, to prevent them and to explain them. Explanatory social and behavioural theories can be of help here. These theories can also help understand why some institutional conditions lead to more 'perverse effects' than others.
Conclusion
Working on these four challenges not only is necessary for keeping evaluation 'active and alive' in what some of us call 'the audit society', but also very likely increases the professional and intellectual quality of the work done by (individual) evaluators. I hope that the evaluation societies now active in Europe are able to help here by bringing together evaluators, both from research and from practice, in projects and other activities. Society at large, then, will judge to what extent our work is beneficial.
Notes
1. But it is a growth market in an 'infant industry' according to Picciotto (2000 
